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Title: Moving from contractor to owner operator: Impact on safety culture; a case 
study 
Abstract 
Purpose –The research study investigated whether a change in staffing contractual 
arrangements, specific training in hazard identification, mentoring of supervisors and the 
introduction of a robust safety system could improve the organisations safety culture. How 
safety conditions change under contracted out labour compared to direct labour and the 
influence that contracting out has on organisational safety culture is explored. 
Design/methodology/approach – The study used a case study methodology to detail how the 
change occurred over a six month period in 2011. As part of the analysis a model of the 
change process and push-pull factors is offered.  
Findings – As a result of the change all areas saw some improvement. Work-related injury 
statistics dropped significantly, supervisors were clear of their roles, actively monitoring their 
crews to ensure they worked in a safer manner than before, and staff were actively addressing 
work-place hazards. With the safety system in place the organisation should be deemed 
compliant and diligent by the state auditing authorities. This study has also shown that using 
contractor workers together with in-house workers that are managed under different safety 
regimes is problematic. The problems don’t occur due to the contractor’s safety systems 
being less robust than the parent company’s or that contract workers are themselves less safe; 
it is the added complexity of managing multiple safety regimes and the lack of trust of the 
robustness of each system that create conflict. 
Research limitations/implications – The paper reports on the change process of one mining 
organisation in Western Australia as a case study from a managerial sample and is thereby 
limited. 
Practical implications – This study demonstrates the difficulties in changing safety culture 
in an underground mining organisation. The paper argues the need for specialised training in 
identifying hazards by the staff, the mentoring of supervisory staff and the adoption of a 
robust safety system to support improved safety culture.  
Originality/value – There is little research conducted in the resources sector researching 
changes in human resource supply and OHS management, in particular moving from 
contracted labour to hiring in-house. This case provides an insight into how a change in 
staffing hiring arrangements together with specific safety initiatives has a positive impact on 
safety performance. 
 
Keywords: Organisational change, Occupational Health and Safety, safety culture, 
underground mining, change agents, contractor staffing arrangements, human resource 




Using the case of an underground mining operation in Western Australia this paper explores 
safety culture change. The research study underpinning this paper sought to understand 
whether a change in staffing contractual arrangements, specialised training in hazard 
identification, mentoring of supervisors and the introduction of a robust safety system could 
improve the organisations safety culture. Of specific interest in the paper is a discussion on 
the influence that using contracted labour as opposed to in-house personnel has on the 
organisational safety culture and subsequent performance. Hence the study mapped in detail 
the change from using a mix of contractor staff and in-house staff by the organisation to 
wholly employing in-house staff. The study also sought to determine whether specific 
training of staff in work-place hazard identification, one-on-one mentoring of supervisory 
staff and the introduction of a robust safety system would lead to a reduction of work-related 
injury. This article explores these issues and provides a model of the change process and the 
push-pull factors organisations of this kind are faced with. The paper begins with a review of 
the change literature before specifically narrowing down to the influence on organisational 
safety culture when using contracted and in-house staff. 
 
CHANGE IN ORGANISATIONS 
Change in organisations can be a difficult, emotional and lengthy process that requires skilful 
negotiations between managers and their employees. This study is no exception. The change 
process often divides the participants into two groups: the change agents (managers) and the 
change recipients (employees) who engage in reciprocal sensemaking throughout. Change 
agents seek to determine strategies to facilitate the change process; whereas the change 
recipient endeavours to determine how the change will directly affect them (Gioia, Thomas, 
Clark & Chittipeddi, 1994). Studies investigating change processes (Berman & McLaughlin, 
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1975; Beer, Eisenstatt & Spector, 1993) highlight the critical need for processes of ‘mutual 
adaptation’.  
Ford, Ford, and D’Amelio (2008)  argue that resistance to the change process may be an 
interpretation made by change agents or that their own actions or inactions may have 
contributed to change recipient’s unwillingness to change their behaviour. They describe 
three sides to the change ‘resistance story’ by change agents. First; it may be viewed as a self-
serving label given by change agents as a reaction by recipients resisting change. Second; the 
change agents own behaviour can promote resistance, for example the breaking of trust 
(Cobb, Wooten & Folger, 1995; Tomlinson, Dineen & Lewicki, 2004), personal relationships 
(Pfeffer, 1994), and incongruent expectations of how the change should occur (Van de Ven & 
Sun, 2011). Third; the resistance to change may be a positive contribution to the change 
process (Knowles & Lin, 2004). Caldwell (2003) asserts that the interactions that occur 
between different change agents within the organisation act as inhibitors to the change 
process or as Van de Ven and Sun (2011) describe as change model breakdowns.  
 
This study supports the second point described by Ford, et al (2008) and the work of 
Caldwell (2003) in that change agents vary from person to person in organisations. Inter 
personal skills and management style can affect the success of change initiatives. For this 
paper, the change process is reviewed according to Van de Ven and Sun’s (2011) discussion 
of the differences in perceptions of change agents of how the change should occur according 
to their individual mental models of change. They explain that due to the differences of 
individuals, their experiences both personal and at work, and the intricacies of their roles and  
responsibilities, change agents and participants have different interpretations and mental 
models of the change process (Van de Ven, Polley, Garud, & Venkataraman, 1999). They 
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argue that participants use these divergent perspectives to support the change or undermine 
and suppress the efforts of change agents.  
 
In order to counter resistance to change Parish, Cadwaller and Busch (2006) suggest that 
there is a belief that change recipients can change without disruption to their work flows and 
that change agents should consider the effect on their employees. They state further that 
without the commitment of employees to the change process behaviours will remain the 
same. Dvir, Kass and Shamir (2004) maintain that working with change recipients in forming 
a vision in which they all share supports behavioural organisational change. It is these 
personal relationships between change agent and recipient that are crucial to affecting lasting 
change (Pfeffer, 1994). Johnson, Parasuraman, Futrell and Black (1990) found that 
employees who have supportive managers are more committed to their organisations and 
Ford, et al (2008) argue that a trusting relationship between change agents and recipients 
further supports organisational change. The change process for the underground mine relied 
on the use of a Safety Consultant to create a link between Management, Supervisors and the 
contracted and in-house mining employees. Management were particularly concerned that the 
change process could affect the trusting relationship that they had with their current 
employees. Where the changes were viewed with hostility the mine manager was able to 
deflect possible confrontations to the consultant. This allowed the personal relationships to 
remain positive between managers and employees throughout the process.  
Contract labour versus direct labour  
This paper focuses on the change process for this organisation in the light of safety 
performance. The success of any culture change is often determined by the level of 
commitment or the value that managers place on the change initiative and their actions as 
change agents (Bahn, 2009). In order to support a change in processes for safety culture 
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improvement, employees need to trust in their managers and supervisors decisions. Trust or 
distrust between managers, supervisors, contracted workers and in-house workers was 
identified as a key predictor of safety performance in UK off-shore gas workers (Conchie & 
Donald, 2006).  Distrust between in-house workers and contractors is exacerbated when each 
group of employees is regulated under differing safety regimes as was the case with the 
organisation investigated for this study.  
 
The organisation, that was the focus of this study, made the move from using contracted staff 
to wholly in-house staff. In recent years, there has been a discussion within the literature 
about the blurring of health and safety management for contracted labour by the host 
organisation by Mayhew and Quinlan (1997); Underhill (2002); Johnstone and Quinlan 
(2006); and James, Johnstone, Quinlan, & Walters, (2007). These studies cited several cases 
of host organisations attempting to shift responsibility back to the contracted firm rather than 
take on that role themselves. Johnstone and Quinlan (2006) point to the blurring of OHS 
responsibilities, precarious employment conditions and the transfer of human resource 
management functions to contractor firms. It was this blurring of responsibility for managing 
safety on site that prompted the move to employing only in-house staff for the organisation 
under study. They indicated difficulties in managing and administering the two safety 
regimes on their site that covered the contracted staff and their in-house staff. This was a 
particular issue for the supervisors and shift bosses who prior to the change had to manage 
under different expectations. Responsibility was blurred, incidents were increasing and 
authority challenged. 
 
Based on the previous empirical research changes to the safety processes for the underground 
mine were determined with the aim to improve the organisational safety culture. A safety 
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management system was introduced to produce safe work procedures (SWPs) and job safety 
analyses (JSAs), site specific safety inductions were revised and updated, and employee’s 
certificates of competency were revisited and reissued under the company banner. 
Professional development training in hazard identification and the subsequent management of 
those hazards was provided by the safety consultant to all employees. In addition, the Safety 
Consultant worked closely with the Shift Supervisors to provide coaching in management and 
leadership skills in an effort to lift the safety practices through proactive auditing and 
identification of areas requiring improvement. 
RESEARCH METHOD  
A critical realist perspective (Sayer, 1992) informed the study. The “realist asserts that 
organisations are real. They have form, structures, boundaries, purposes and goals, resources, 
and members whose behaviours result from structured relations among them” (Dubin, 
1982:372). Sayer (1992) defines organisational structures as sets of internally related objects 
and mechanisms as ways of acting. Objects are internally linked to the structure and their 
identity depends on their relationship with the other components of the structure. Regulations 
are structures within organisations; safe work practice is the mechanism and action of those 
in the workplace. Actions are mediated by the structures of regulation, training, and safety 
culture maturity. This was a qualitative study for which the data collected were 
conceptualised and reduced, ‘elaborating categories in terms of their properties and 
dimensions, and relating through a series of prepositional statements’ (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998:12) or coding. This process allowed for the emergence of key sensitising concepts from 
the data (McConnell, 2002) and thus alerted the researcher to possible avenues for future 
investigation (Clarke, 1997). The analysis of the data taps into the strengths of qualitative 
research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Greabner, 2007; Yin, 2003) to understand how 
organisations make and adapt to change. 
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The research questions for the study were: 
1. How does changing the employment arrangements of staff impact on safety culture? 
2. Does specific safety training, mentoring of supervisors and the use of safety systems 
result in reduced work-related injuries? 
The sample for the study was limited to the Underground Mine Manager who was 
interviewed by telephone three times during the change process: at the beginning of the 
study, at the end of the change process and half way through; and the safety consultant was 
interviewed every week during the process. Work-related injury statistics were collected and 
tracked from July 2010 to September 2011. It was not possible to interview employees for 
this study due to funding restraints. 
 
FINDINGS  
In February 2011 the decision was made by the Board of an underground mining operation in 
Western Australia (WA) to move from employing contracted staff at their site to only employ 
in-house staff. The reasoning behind this change in staffing arrangements was due to a rising 
trend in work-related injury and equipment damage incidents. At this time they had staff from 
two different contractors as well as their own, managed under two different safety regimes. 
They had a total of 77 employees, 54 of which were contractors working for the company and 
23 direct employees. Their plan was to directly hire these contractor workers and this 
required them to re-apply for their positions to the mining company. About half of the 
contractors were hired directly by the company and the remaining half filled by new 
employees. To this end part of the change process was to employ the best contractors and to 
weed out those who were underperforming. In May 2011, a Safety Consultant was contracted 
to facilitate and manage the change process. From the perspective of managing occupational 
health and safety (OHS) several processes were required so that the mine was compliant 
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including: ensuring that there were adequate safe work procedures in place to cover the 
employee’s tasks, capturing their specific work tasks within the site inductions, and re-issuing 
competency tickets and licences. The change process was to be completed by 1
st
 August 
2011; however the required documentation such as Safe Work Procedures (SWPs) and Job 
Hazard Analyses (JSAs) were not completed until the end of October 2011 and thus the 
project over ran by 10 weeks. 
Beginning the change 
The safety consultant was intensively engaged over twenty four weeks to complete the 
process. Table 1 details the tasks and significant outcomes as they were occurred.  
 
Insert table 1 here 
 
In the first week a telephone interview was conducted with the Underground Mine Manager 
(UMM) to ascertain his aspirations and expectations of the change process. He explained the 
reason behind the change from hiring contractor labour to having all workers on the mine 
directly employed by the company: 
“The reason we wanted to go owner operator is that the contractor staff because they 
were from a labour hire company didn’t really want to accept responsibility for their 
people even though they were employed by them and using their equipment, so it 
made it very hard for the Shift Supervisors because they [contractor] weren’t taking 
ownership of the contracted workforce”. 
 
The UMM defended the introduction to a new safety management system: 
“With the safety system introduction because the workforce was mainly supplied by 
the contractor we agreed to use their safety management system and procedures and 
everything else. It was a pretty good system, overall it was ok. With moving to the new 
system it’s a system I’ve used before and one I like and it gets the employee 
involvement and they have ownership of the procedures. It’s fully auditable and 
compliant and the thing I like the most is that it has specific task observations 




He explained the philosophy behind the change process: 
“Every mine goes through various stages where everything is going ok, people get to 
a complacency level and then everything starts to drop off. I think that’s pretty 
natural with human behaviour. When we went through and had a look at our 
incidents a lot of them were just stupid little incidents that shouldn’t have happened. 
It’s basic awareness, basic hazard recognition”. 
 
The UMM explained the issues around managing and identifying hazardous situations within 
the workplace and the significant skills and training that are required for these tasks to be 
conducted properly: 
 
“Most organisations who go through this change start off with Job Safety Analysis 
training. But to do a JSA you need to know how to identify a hazard and how to 
manage that hazard. Also much of this training is done on the surface [in the 
classroom] but no one ever goes into the workplace with them. So if you train them on 
the surface, that’s where it stays. That is an important part of the process for me to 
get the consultant to go with the guys underground and point out the hazards with 
them”. 
 
Individual coaching with the Supervisors of each shift was a priority in the change process: 
 
“I also want the consultant to spend time with the Supervisors. If the supervisors 
aren’t questioning and the supervisors aren’t driving, then the whole battle is lost. 
You win or lose on the quality of the supervision”. 
 
 
The UMM was asked to summarise what he wanted to achieve in the change process by the 
1
st
 August 2011: 
 
“By the August 1st the thing I’d like to achieve the most, that’s technical the start of 
the new contract and would be the day of a full {company} workforce. It’ll be the first 
day of a more focussed underground workforce. The ownership will be a lot higher 
and we should also have all the new procedures in ready to truly move forward”.  
 
The UMM discussed his hopes for future change and improvement stating that supervision 
skill improvement and a reduction is workplace incidents were a priority: 
 
“In the long run come post August after this process, really what you want to see are 




“I am looking for a massive improvement in our safety performance. I don’t think we 
have a bad safety record. But once you start having silly incidents, and a lot of them, 
you start building up the probability of having a bad accident – they are lead 
indicators. So this is a way of improving our safety in an effort not to have a serious 
accident”. 
 
In this first week the Safety Consultant was asked what he perceived his role to be in the 
change process. 
“I was asked to set up new site procedures in alignment with ISO 31000. It was also 
recognised that the Shift Supervisor skills were varied and that the project was going 
to be not only the procedures but training their middle managers to manage to a 
safety culture”. 
 
With the change plan in place, the first task that management determined needed to begin the 
change process was to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the staff in their ability to 
identify work place hazards. Training in identifying hazards was delivered as a classroom 
workshop and by walking around the staff’s work areas in week 1. The staff were divided 
into 6 groups (18 mixed teams of 4-6) over three consecutive days, 54 of which were 
contractors working for the company and 23 direct employees. It was found that the range of 
workplace hazards they could identify was extensive by some groups and very limited by 
others (Bahn, 2012). For example length of experience underground did not predetermine an 
ability to identify hazards. During this week random checks underground revealed the safe 
work instruction procedures had not been completed and that rock headings remained 
unsecured by some crews with no acknowledgement of the safety risk. 
 
In week two the hazards identified in the first workshop were revisited in follow up training 
to determine strategies they could use to address the hazards they had identified. 
Interestingly, one team set the task of identifying strategies to address emerging hazards 
could not commence the task at all and required one-on-one assistance by the training 
facilitator. These were not inexperienced staff; in fact there was an average of twelve years 
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underground experience between the teams’ participants. Conversely, some of the most 
recent entrants to underground mining within the teams showed greater understanding in 
addressing and managing hazards than the long term employees (Bahn, 2012). It was noted 
that after these two training workshops that the mine had achieved its first two week period 
free from incidents. Once again random checks underground were conducted during this 
week to find that all shifts audited had completed their safe work instruction processes. 
 
The rewriting of the visitor, surface and underground workplace inductions began in week 
three along with the introduction of a safety management system. The first eighty Job Safety 
Analyses documents were sent to the staff responsible to edit and authorise the correct 
content. Additionally in week 3 the positions held by the contractor staff were reapplied for to 
work as a mine employee. The Safety and Training Officer of the organisation resigned to 
take up a position with another company at the end of September. The resignation of the 
Safety and Training Officer was considered beneficial to the company as this employee was 
not performing his role adequately and the slippage in safety performance was in part 
attributed to his inability to better manage the role. 
 
In week 4 all staff were taken through an overview of effectively completing writing a job 
safety analysis including the risk ranking of workplace hazards. Risk ranking tools are 
commonly used in organisations; those in supervisor/management roles had used these tools 
before, however most of the staff had no knowledge of how to use this tool. In addition the 
staff had little appreciation of the perception of how risk is viewed between individuals 
(Manuele, 2010). It was evident at this stage of the change process that the staff had a mix of 
expertise, experience, literacy and numeracy skills.  WA, at this time, was entering into 
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another period of increased mining production and experiencing a shortage of skilled 
workers. 
 
The staff identified in the hazard identification workshop in week 1 that they needed 
increased training and clearer and extensive communication in regards to the impending 
change process. In week 4 the Human Resource representative for the company began to 
address the request for communication to the staff working in underground duties. Although 
this was requested in the workshop when explaining the change process to the staff he asked 
if there were any queries. The response he received from one senior staff member working as 
an underground operator was “I’m not interested; I just want to go back to work 
underground”. 
 
The hard work phase 
In the 8 week period between weeks 5-12, coaching of the Shift Supervisors in effective 
leadership became a priority and entailed the consultant accompanying them on daily visits 
underground. Positive changes in behaviour were noted by management in that the shift 
bosses were becoming more effective in their managing and delegation skills.  
 
Additionally, the writing and reviewing of Job Safety Analyses (JSA) for all tasks carried out 
by the underground staff was well underway. The first 80 JSAs had been issued to the staff in 
week 3 of the process. These documents had been edited and were signed off as correct and 
were awaiting input into Safe Work Procedures (SWPs). The final 80 JSAs were distributed 




In week 13 the writing of the visitors, surface and underground inductions was completed. In 
this week the mine experienced a lost time injury. At the end of this week a second interview 
was conducted with the UMM who reported that there was evidence that the change process 
was having a positive effect on the workforce as displayed in the extreme reaction to the first 
Lost Time Injury the mine had experienced in two years. 
“We had a bit of a setback this week because we had an LTI [Lost time injury] – that 
was pretty disappointing. But overall things are going very well with positive 
feedback from the Supervisors. I think they have started to step up more to the plate. 
They are beginning to hold their crews to account; you can see the general frustration 
from them when they see things happening that shouldn’t have happened. The guys 
seem a lot more passionate about their own safety performance and that was pretty 
evident after we announced the LTI this week because there were a lot of unhappy 
people across the crews. They were furious!” 
 
The change practices of the Safety Consultant were unusual when compared to other training 
in that part of his role was to directly challenge the Shift Supervisors and their crews in their 
everyday work practices. 
 
“It’s very rare to have the trainer challenge people on the job and I think that it’s had 
a major impact. It reinforces from the classroom into the workplace and I think that’s 
what’s been important”.  
 
Week 14 – 1st August deadline 
The 1
st
 August 2011 marked the date of the new contract with the underground mine with all 
staff now employed by the mine and no contracted staff within the workforce. New mining 
equipment was introduced along with a new equipment maintenance contract. The visitors, 
surface and underground inductions had been completed and were in use. Eighty JSAs had 
been approved by the staff by 1
st
 August, with the final 80 were still being circulated. No 
JSAs had been converted into SWPs and consequently the mine was continuing to use the 
contractors SWPs even though none of their staff were working on the mine. The UMM was 
asked to reflect on where they were in the change process and it was noted that although the 
written documentation such as the JSAs and Procedures were about a month behind there was 
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evidence that concerted effort by the staff was occurring to complete and that the existing 
procedures provided by the contractor could continue in the very short term. 
“We are a month behind from where I wanted to be but there was a lot of other work 
put in with the Supervisors, the guys are now really beginning to put in an effort now 
and take ownership of it [the Safety System]”. 
 
“We can run under the existing ones [procedures and JSA’s] for another month, so we 
are pretty covered. There has been a lot of rationalisation from the safety side to tie in 
our site with the rest of the mining operations”.  
 
The Safety Consultant explained that the overrun of the project was due to the 
misunderstanding by management of how long the change process would take to achieve 
commitment and ownership of the staff. 
 
“The task that was outlined was bigger than the client thought. The timing was 
always going to depend on accessibility to the people and the importance of the 
process to the people”. 
 
The Safety Consultant confirmed that the success of the change process to this point was due 
to the close working relationship with them in their actual work areas, rather than relying on 
training in the classroom setting. 
“Visiting the people in their work areas has contributed to the credibility of the 
training and changes”. 
 
Looking forward the UMM was asked to determine what he could see as a mechanism to bed 
down the change and ensure it remained constant. He explained how that even though 
extensive and solid safety systems could be put in place and audited on a regular basis there 
was no guarantee that people would indeed follow them. However, from a compliance 
perspective regular audits demonstrate that staff understand and are aware of the correct 
manner to carry out a task.  
 
“The cycle needs to continue, the procedures look after themselves, but the key to 
success with this system is the Supervisors doing individual task observations. We 
need to get the consultant in every two months to audit the Shift Supervisors. If in the 
event something happens [serious incident] I can turn around and say I audited the 
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Shift Supervisors and say they did it correctly at the time of the audit. If they do it 
differently from when they are audited then really it’s the Supervisors who will be 
hung out to dry because they have demonstrated that they know the system and 
haven’t complied with the system”. 
 
Finalising the change 
Although the majority of the people working for the underground mine had adopted the new 
processes and had shown significant improvement there were still some staff who continued 
to act irresponsibly. In week 15 the mine recorded three incidents involving damage to plant 
that required investigation. The staff responsible for these breaches in safety were newly 
appointed staff that had not undergone the hazard identification training held in week one of 
the change process and were assigned to one of the four Shift Supervisors at the mine. The 
result of the investigation included the dismissal of two of the staff. It was evident that this 
Shift Supervisor had failed to mentor and monitor his staff. The Safety Consultant began 
intensive mentoring with this Shift Supervisor in week 16 to begin to address and improve his 
leadership skills. In addition, the recruitment processes were reviewed to place greater 
emphasis on safety practices and experience. In weeks 16-20 all 160 JSAs were awaiting sign 
off by the UMM. The decision was made to have the newly appointed Safety and Training 
Officer review these documents before final sign off by the UMM. By the end of week 20 
four JSAs had been reviewed and approved by the Safety and Training Officer. The change 
process had lost some momentum due to the resignation of the UMM and the mine going into 
caretaker management for three months. Prior to the UMM leaving an exit telephone 
interview was conducted to collect narrative on his perception of the change process up to 
this point. Although he found the training effective at the start of the change process the 
effect on safety practice was short lived as is evident in Figure 1. The UMM attributed the 
decreasing trend in incidents to the improvement in the Shift Supervisor’s managerial skills 
as a result of the intense mentoring that had occurred.  
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“I think the training was effective and its effectiveness was for two months. What is 
more important is the coaching of the supervisors. That is probably to me the single 
most important thing. The training was the start of the process, for the first three 
months it had a big impact in month one, less in month two and three and that is 
where the workforce was pretty much the same. What has changed is the supervisors 
are starting to hold their guys to account and that is the single biggest influence to me 
of the whole process”. 
 
In week 21, UMM position become a caretaker role with a temporary 3 month appointment in 
place while the formal recruitment occurred. The new UMM was highly supportive of the 
change and actively reviewed the JSAs and began the sign off process. By the end of October 
(week 24) all JSAs had been approved by the UMM and the Safety and Training Officer 
(STO) with the Safety Consultant converting the JSAs into Safe Work Procedures. The 
Safety Consultant provided this final comment: 
“The process of change is slow and laborious and subject to the participants daily 
priorities.  An organisation needs time to effectively implement change. The bigger 
the organisation the longer the period time it seems”. 
 
Incident statistics and the change 
Figure 1 provides actual reported incident numbers for the underground mine between July 
2010 and September 2011. Incidents are divided into 8 categories: Lost Time Injury, Near 
Miss, Modified Work Injury, Medical Treatment Injury, First Aid Injury, Environmental 
Damage, Non Compliance (not performing task according to procedures) and Equipment 
damage. It should be noted again that there had been no fatalities at this mine site during this 
period. There was one lost time injury in March 2011 and another in July, prior to these two 
incidents the mine had been lost time injury free for almost 2 years. The figure shows that 
February 2011 recorded the highest number of equipment damage incidents that by April 
2011 had reduced by 50% but were back to the high level by August 2011. However, it 
should be noted that August marked the change to a new machinery maintenance contract, 
the introduction of new machinery and the employment of new personnel. In addition there 
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was pressure on sourcing skilled workers due to increased mining activity in WA at this time 
and a replacement Safety and Training Officer did not commence work until October 2011. It 
could be argued that all of these factors contributed to the jump in equipment damage 
incidents in August. First Aid Injury incidents remained fairly constant between March and 
July 2011 but gradually reducing from July 2011. Near misses decreased from February 2011 
with none reported in May, June and August 2011. All other incident categories reported 
remained infrequent and at constant low numbers. Of the 80 reported incidents since April 
2011, 35 were attributed to newly employed personnel that hadn’t undergone the hazard 
identification of management of hazards training. Prior to the safety culture change initiative 
the incident statistics were generally trending upwards. From April 2011 this trend reversed 
suggesting the training, mentoring and documenting of safe work procedures had a positive 
effect on the safety culture.  
 
Examples of damage to equipment incidents included: tyre damage on heavy machinery and 
damage to vehicles through rocks hitting or rolling onto them and reversing into walls. 
Examples of medically treated injuries included: sprains and strains and a fracture. Examples 
of first aid injuries included: sprains and strains cuts and abrasions and an eye injury. Near 
miss examples included: Failure to use fall arrest equipment, vehicles left running without 
wheel chocks in place, and a refuge chamber with inadequate carbon dioxide cylinders.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
Modelling the change 
Figure 2 models the change process of the organisation and illustrates the push-pull factors 
that determined the need to change. Prior to the change the organisation was accessing staff 
through two contracting agencies as well as some limited in-house staff. This arrangement 
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placed pressure on the front line supervisory staff in that the two contractors managed their 
staff through their specific safety systems, policies and procedures and this left the supervisor 
unsure of his role and his ability to discipline the staff under him. In addition the organisation 
did not have their own safety system in place but relied on one of the contractors systems 
instead. The lack of ownership of their own specific policies, procedures, inductions and 
safety documents placed the organisation at the risk of being deemed non-compliant if 
formally audited by the states mining regulators. In addition because the organisation was 
failing in their due diligence in these areas and had limited safety training in place for staff it 
was at risk of having a serious work-related injury occur. This was a major concern of the 
UMM and hence the organisation was encouraged to change. As a result of the change all 
areas saw some improvement even though the incidents figures rose and fell and rose again 
as is the case of the equipment damage in August. Work-related injury statistics dropped 
significantly (particularly in the September 2011 figures), supervisors were clear of their 
roles and actively became engaged in monitoring their crews to ensure they worked in a safer 
manner than before, and staff were actively addressing work-place hazards. With the safety 
system in place and in active use the organisation should be deemed compliant and diligent 
by the state auditing authorities. Finally, where some staff were resistant to the change 
resulting in some resignations at the end of the process those remaining with the organisation 
had come to an understanding and support of new regime.   
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
DISCUSSION 
Change takes longer than is planned and is not an easy process. The original contract with the 
Safety Consultant was to achieve the change process by August 1
st
 2011 when the mine 
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would no longer employ contracted staff. The process overran by 12 weeks and was 
completed at the end of October with a ‘bedding down’ period of two weeks in November.  
 
Although damage to equipment incidents continued to occur there was some evidence that 
the new safety system and mentoring of Shift Supervisors had resulted in positive safety 
culture improvement. It should be noted that many of these incidents occurred with newly 
appointed staff who had not undergone the hazard identification training. The upward trend 
of incidents reversed from April 2011 to that of a general downward trend. Injuries requiring 
First Aid treatment were on a decreasing trend and near misses were not only reducing but for 
three months during the change process none had been recorded. However, the mine recorded 
its first lost time injury for two years in July 2011.  
 
The Underground Mine Manager expected all staff to adopt the new safety system and accept 
the changes to the organisation without hindering the process resulting in a significant 
reduction in incidents. However, there was some resistance in that some staff continued to 
ignore directives and procedural change and continue to operate in their preferred manner. 
This was mostly with newly appointed staff who had not been a part of the change process 
from the outset. For example, there were still regular breaches of procedures such as idling 
vehicles left unattended, failure to wear seatbelts and non completion of safe work 
instructions prior to beginning work. These breaches could be described as Ford et al 
(2008:362) have as “unreasonable obstacles or barriers” to block the change process. 
Subsequently there was not the significant sustained reduction in incidents that was the vision 
of the Underground Mine Manager and the Safety Consultant. This aligns with the findings 
of Van de Ven and Sun (2011) who noted that change agents and participants can have 
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opposing views of the outcomes of the change process and that these views can restrict the 
change outcomes. 
 
The Underground Mine Manager recognised that it was imperative to enlist the support of the 
Shift Supervisors in the change process as not all staff were promoting the changes. As Ford 
et al (2008) noted change agents inactions may contribute to the change recipient’s 
unwillingness to change their behaviour. Caldwell (2003) argued that successful change relies 
on the inter personal and management style of change agents. To address these shortcomings 
significant concentrated mentoring occurred with the Shift Supervisors to encourage them to 
champion the changes with their crews; to become active change agents. There was evidence 
that their leadership abilities had improved with several managers actively demanding 
improved practice. Safe Work Procedures were updated and with a scheduled monitoring to 
ensure relevance and continued compliance.  
 
Several personnel changes occurred in the company during the change process. The STO who 
was particularly unsupportive of the change initiatives resigned in April 2011 and was 
replaced in August 2011. The replacement STO commenced employment 1
st
 August and 
demonstrated clear support and the safety system was handed over to him to manage. This 
staff member was ready to take on the challenge of bedding down the change and to become 
the champion of the safety system for the organisation.  New staff continued to be appointed 
through the process with 20% of the workforce failing to be included in the hazard 
identification and management training provided at the beginning of the change process. It 
was agreed that the hazard identification and management training would be conducted 
regularly (3 times a year) by the STO with new staff members. The Underground Mining 
Manager was head hunted to work for a much larger resources company in Queensland and 
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left the company at the end of September 2011. Fortunately, the incoming Underground 
Mining Manager, who was on a temporary 3 month contract, was highly supportive of the 
changes.  
Conclusion 
Prior to the change the organisation was accessing staff through two contracting agencies as 
well as some limited in-house staff. This arrangement placed pressure on the front line 
supervisory staff in that the two contractors managed their staff through their specific safety 
systems, policies and procedures and this left the supervisor unsure of his role and his ability 
to discipline the staff under him. This study has shown that using contractor workers together 
with in-house workers that are managed under different safety regimes is problematic. The 
problems don’t occur due to the contractor’s safety systems being less robust than the parent 
company’s or that contract workers are themselves less safe; rather in a forthcoming paper in 
this journal by Bahn and Rainnie (forthcoming) it is the opposite that can occur. The problem 
in this instance was that there were two safety regimes in play prior to the change process. 
The organisation did not have their own safety system in place but relied on one of the 
contractors systems instead. The lack of ownership of their own specific policies, procedures, 
inductions and safety documents placed the organisation at the risk of being deemed non-
compliant if formally audited by the states mining regulators. The contractors and in-house 
staff didn’t trust each other to work as safely as possible under the differing safety 
requirements of the two systems. The company needed to either employ all contracted staff 
under their own safety regime or all in-house staff (as they chose) to reduce the complexity of 
managing numerous systems and improve overall safety performance and a stronger safety 
culture.  
Because the organisation was failing in their due diligence in these areas and had limited 
safety training in place for staff it was at risk of having a serious work-related injury occur. 
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As a result of the change all areas saw some improvement although there were increases in 
equipment damage again in August and a LTI was recorded in July. The change process was 
compromised by the UMM’s resignation and this threatened sustained safety performance. 
However, the positive results attributed to the change process included: the work-related 
injury statistics that dropped significantly (particularly in the September 2011 figures), 
supervisors were clear of their roles and actively became engaged in monitoring their crews 
to ensure they worked in a safer manner than before, and staff were actively addressing work-
place hazards. Although the short-term spike in incidents in November to February of 2011 
appear similar to those recorded post April 2011, the improvement in safety procedures and 
their formalization remain regardless of the measured outcomes. The new safety 
mechanisms are more comprehensive and internally consistent than when workers were 
employed as contractors and in-house under two different safety regimes. With the safety 
system in place and in active use the organisation should be deemed compliant and diligent 
by the state auditing authorities.  
This study demonstrates the difficulties in facilitating change in safety culture in an 
underground mining organisation. It also shows that by focussing on hazard identification 
and management of hazards training, one-on-one mentoring of Shift Supervisors and the 
introduction of a robust safety management system has positive improvement on incident 
statistics. However, it is yet to be seen if the reduction in incident statistics continues to 
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Figure 2: Modelling the change process against push-pull factors 
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Table 1: The change process  
Week Change process Results 
1 Conduct hazard identification training 
workshops with all staff including 
management to determine the level of ability. 
Accompany shifts underground to identify 
obvious and emerging hazards.  
Checks on 4 shifts revealed that in 2 
cases rocks were ready to fall from the 
heading – they had not been secured 
and it was not recognised by employees 
as a potential hazard. 
2 Conduct hazard management training to 
determine the strategies that can be used to 
reduce the risk. 
2 weeks incident free – this was the first 
time the mine had a two week period 
free from incidents. 
Checks on 4 shifts revealed that all 4 
had completed their safe work 
inspections. 
3 Redrafting of visitors, surface and 
underground inductions. Introduction of safety 
management system. Contractor employees 
reapplying for their positions. Financial 
incentive discussed by management to reward 
staff who identified and addressed hazards. 
Drafting of 160 Job Safety Analyses (JSA). 
The re-employment of contractor staff 
in some instances at a reduced rate. 
Safety and Training Officer resigned 
and position advertised. 
4 All staff trained in the effective writing of job 
safety analyses. 80 Job Safety Analyses sent to 
staff to review. 
Staff had no knowledge of how to use a 
risk ranking tool. 
 
5-12 Coaching of shift bosses and supervisors in 
effective leadership. Visits underground. 
Review of final 20 JSA’s by staff.  
Shift Supervisors were displaying more 
effective leadership skills such as 
delegation of tasks to other staff. 
13 Completion of visitors, surface and 
underground inductions. 
Lost Time Injury occurred – Shift 
Supervisors extremely upset. 
14 1
st
 August deadline. All staff employed by 
mine – no contractor staff. Inductions 
approved and in use. Still operating under 
contractors Safe Work Procedures (SWP) as 
JSA’s are still circulating, requiring approval 
and sign off before SWP conversion. 
Underground Mine Manager happy 
with Shift Supervisors improvement in 
taking ownership of the change process. 
15-20 All Job Safety Analyses completed and 
waiting for sign off by Underground Mine 
Manager.  
3 incidents that involved damage to 
machinery on the same shift resulting in 
the sacking of two workers and 
intensive mentoring of the Shift 
Supervisor.  
Underground Mine Manager resigned 




160 JSAs reviewed by Underground Mine 
Manager and Safety and Training Officer and 
reissued to all personnel across all 4 shifts for 
final sign off and production into Safe Work 
procedures. 
Appointment of temporary 
Underground Mine Manager for 3 
months during formal recruitment 
process. 
Lowest number of incidents recorded 
(Sept) since beginning of the change 
process. 
 
